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1ON THE MEASUREMENT OF INEQUALITY IN THE
DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN VOTING PROCEDURES
Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano
ABSTRACT
This paper deals with the assessment of inequality in the distribution of voting power.
As voting procedures are modeled as simple games and power evaluated through power
indices, two approaches are possible to deal with inequality in this context, depending
on whether the power pro¯les generated by some power index or the simple games that
model the voting rules are taken as primitives. In both cases the mechanical application
of previous results does not make sense. This paper uses the ¯rst approach to found
axiomatically some inequality indices in this speci¯c context and discusses some di±culties
with the second approach.
KEYWORDS: Inequality; Power Indices; Voting Power; Collective Decision-Making.
21I N T R O D U C T I O N
This paper is concerned with the assessment of inequality in the distribution of power in
collective decision-making procedures. This issue arises naturally in di®erent contexts as
a matter of practical interest. For instance, in the comparison between alternative speci¯-
cations of voting rules for decision-making by a given set of agents (councils, committees,
parliaments, etc.). A precise tool to make such comparisons would be of great interest
for the design of voting procedures. A relevant case-study, the evolution through years of
t h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fp o w e ra m o n gt h ec i t i z e n si nt h eE u r o p e a nU n i o nh a si nf a c tb e e nt h e
original motivation of this work (Laruelle, 1998).
With this practical-design motivation in mind, the aim of this paper is to provide
a tool to measure inequality in voting procedures. Such a tool should be axiomatically
grounded -it may be convenient to remark- in the speci¯c context of voting power. Usually
decision-making procedures are formally described as simple games and power evaluated
through power indices. Thus, two approaches are possible to deal with inequality in this
context, depending on whether the power pro¯les generated by some power index or the
simple games that model the voting rules are taken es primitives.
The ¯rst option immediately suggests to apply some of the indices provided by the rich
literature on inequality. But this literature is concerned with the distribution of income
(see, e.g., Atkinson (1970), Kolm (1976), Shorrocks (1980), Weymark (1981), Yaari (1988)
and Porath and Gilboa (1994)), while here we are concerned with a completely di®erent
and more elusive concept: "power". Moreover, most axioms in this literature not even ¯t
a domain consisting of a ¯nite set of pro¯les as it happens to be the case. Therefore the
adequacy of tools developed in a thoroughly di®erent conceptual context is not obvious
and would require at least a re-foundation. This is the approach, outlined a few lines
below, adopted here.
Alternatively, the fact that simple games can be used to model voting procedures may
suggest adopting Einy and Peleg's (1991) approach to deal with inequality in TU-games.
They directly axiomatize a family of inequality measures, which are generalized Gini func-
tions of the Shapley value of the games, using these games as primitives. According to
them, any similar endeavour taking as primitives the outcomes of any particular solution
concept would yield an ad hoc measure of inequality, because of the multiplicity of solu-
tions. But, paradoxically, the outcome of their approach is that only one solution, the
Shapley value, ¯lters through their axioms. In fact, they implicitly assume e±ciency in
the underlying solutions which allows them to exclude from consideration any semivalue
but the Shapley value. More generally, their approach has the drawback of mixing the
assessment of two di®erent things: "value" and "inequality" in the distribution of it. As
3a consequence, some of their axioms are not transparent. As to the restriction of their
results to simple games as models of voting procedures, it is even more arguable. In fact,
Einy and Peleg consider this application one of the motivations of their work, but again
the speci¯city of the context poses some problems. First, the implicit assumption of e±-
ciency is especially arguable in the context of simple games as models of decision-making
procedures. Indeed e±ciency is not any more a natural requirement for a solution in this
context: 1, the worth of the grand coalition, cannot be interpreted as a cake that has
to be (e±ciently) distributed among the players1 (Laruelle and Valenciano, 1999). More-
over, this assumption results in arbitrarily considering the Banzhaf index, one of the most
widely applied power indices and arguably the most suitable in many applications (see
Felsenthal and Machover's (1998) and Laruelle (1999)), as any other semivalue, as "un-
reasonable". Second, the addition of two simple games is not a simple game. Therefore
those of their axioms that use addition of games (namely, "restricted additivity" and "in-
dependence") should be reformulated in this speci¯c context. Although the reformulation
is possible (in Section 4 we sketch this adaptation and compare their results with ours),
the natural translation of some of their axioms lacks a compelling justi¯cation in terms
of voting procedures. In the concluding remarks, we come back to this point and show
how one of their axioms even seems quite counterintuitive in this speci¯c context. On
the other hand, they do not single out an index, but a family, and only consider a ¯xed
number of players. Therefore any possible application of their work would require some
further choice to single out an index. But they give no hint for this further choice and the
comparison of inequality in games with di®erent number of players is not considered.
In sum, the mechanical application of indices axiomatically grounded on either ap-
proach would not be justi¯ed. In both cases a re-foundation is previously necessary. This
paper is a ¯rst step in this direction. In a ¯rst step it seems only prudent to separate
power and the inequality in the distribution of it, necessarily intermingled in Einy and
Peleg's approach. Consequently we take the ¯rst approach. Nevertheless, we give some
clues and point out some problems for the adaptation of Einy and Peleg's approach and
show the relation of our indices with theirs.
Thus, our approach can be summarized as follows. Voting rules are modeled as simple
superadditive games. The distribution of power among the agents is then evaluated by
power indices that associate a power pro¯le with each game. To compare power pro¯les
according to the degree of inequality in the distribution of power some indices (i.e., real-
valued functions on the set of all possible power pro¯les) are axiomatically characterized.
1A tl e a s ti fp o w e ri si n t e r p r e t e di nt h es e n s ew eu s et h et e r mh e r e ,t h a ti s ,t h eap r i o r icapacity to
in°uence the outcome of a vote ("I-power" in Felsenthal and Machover's (1998) terminology).
4To this end we propose properties for an inequality index that have a meaning in terms
of the involved concept of power. As power and inequality are here explicitly separated,
di®erent power indices can be considered. So far, no agreement has been reached among
the scholars concerning the choice of the most suitable index. In fact, it may depend on
the particular context (Laruelle, 1999). Therefore in this paper, we deal with the two best
known power indices, that is to say, the Shapley-Shubik index (1954) and the Banzhaf
index (1965), but in fact our treatment of the latter could be easily extended to any
semivalue. As the set of Shapley-Shubik power pro¯les di®ers from the set of Banzhaf
power pro¯les, they are separately dealt with.
As the number of n-person simple games is ¯nite, the number of possible power pro¯les,
is ¯nite too whatever the power index being used. In order to introduce and formalize in
a more tractable way any index of inequality in this context, we extend the set of feasible
pro¯les by convexifying these ¯nite sets. This convexi¯cation corresponds to enlarging
the underlying set of games to the set of all convex combinations of simple superadditive
games. Any game from this set can be interpreted as a lottery on simple games, in which
the worth of a coalition is its probability of being winning. Then, consistently, the Shapley
value and the Banzhaf semivalue of this game can be interpreted as an expected-power
pro¯le. In this paper, we therefore model and rank decision-making processes and lotteries
on them. As a result, the domain of our inequality indices are closed convex sets of power
pro¯les, instead the usual Rn
+ for income pro¯les. Moreover, this underlying choice gives
support to a solid assumption in this context: our restricted or not "expected inequality
on co-ranked pro¯les."
The results obtained in this paper are the following. In the case of Shapley-Shubik
power pro¯les, two plausible properties restrict drastically the class of indices to a family
closely related to Einy and Peleg's family. Then, adding some conditions we characterize,
up to a positive constant, a unique inequality index for any ¯xed number of players. By
adding any of two alternative equivalence principles we extend in two ways this index to
deal with comparisons of power pro¯les with di®erent number of players. In the case of
Banzhaf power pro¯les a distinction is also made between absolute and relative inequality
indices, so that two indices, one of either class, are characterized up to a positive constant
for any ¯xed number of players. Four inequality indices arise then to deal with comparisons
of power pro¯les with di®erent number of players. The working of the indices is then
illustrated in the UN Security Council.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the basic game theoretical background
is given. In Section 3 the class of simple superadditive games is extended to deal with
lotteries on decision-making processes. Then Dubey and Shapley's axiomatizations of
5Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices are extended to this wider domain. In Section 4, an
inequality index to compare Shapley-Shubik power pro¯les is axiomatically characterized
for a ¯xed number of agents, and then extended in two ways to compare pro¯les with
di®erent number of agents. In Section 5 a similar construction is done for Banzhaf power
pro¯les, where the distinction between relative and absolute inequality give rise to two
couples of indices. In Section 6 the study of the inequality in the UN Security Council
questions the 1965 reform of its decision-procedure. Finally, Section 7 concludes with some
critical remarks on the results presented in this paper and a brief discussion on some lines
for further research.
2 BASIC GAME THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A cooperative transferable utility (TU) game is a pair (N;v), where N = f1;:::;ng denotes
the set of players and v a function which assigns a real number to each non-empty subset
or coalition of N and v(;) = 0. The number of players in a coalition S is denoted s.I na
(0;1)-game, the function v only assigns the values 0 and 1. In these games the coalitions
with worth 1 are referred to as winning, while those with worth 0 as losing.Ap l a y e ri is
said to be a swinger in a coalition S,i fS is winning and S nf ig is not. For any coalition





1i f T ¶ S
0o t h e r w i s e .
A simple game is a (0;1)-game that is not identically 0 and obeys the condition of mono-
tonicity: v(T) ¸ v(S)w h e n e v e rT ¶ S.Ag a m ei ssuperadditive if v(S [T) ¸ v(S)+v(T)
whenever S \ T = ;. In the context of simple games, the superadditivity property is
equivalent to the condition: v(S)+v(N n S) · 1 for all S ½ N.L e t SGn (resp., Gn)
denote the set of all simple (resp., the set of all) superadditive n-person games. Note that
Gn is included in the 2n ¡ 1 euclidean space.
A decision-making procedure can be modeled as a (0;1)-game where the winning coali-
tions are de¯ned as those which can make a decision without the vote of the remaining
players. In this context we usually have that (i) the unanimity of the players can make
a decision; (ii) any subset of a losing coalition is losing; and (iii), any two nonintersect-
ing coalitions cannot be winning at the same time. Thus any decision-making process
satisfying these conditions can be modeled by a simple superadditive game.
A power index is a function © : SGn ! Rn that assigns to each simple superadditive
game (N;v)av e c t o ro rpower pro¯le ©(v)w h o s eith component is interpreted as a measure
of the in°uence that player i can exert on the outcome. To evaluate the distribution
6of power among the players, the two best known power indices are the Shapley-Shubik
(1954) index and the Banzhaf (1965) index. Formally, the Shapley-Shubik index is given





(s ¡ 1)!(n ¡ s)!
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[v(S) ¡ v(S nf ig)], i =1 ;:::;n.( 1 )







[v(S) ¡ v(S nf ig)], i =1 ;:::;n.( 2 )
Both 'i(v)a n d¯i(v) can be interpreted as the probability of player i being a swinger in
the coalition voting a proposal according to the voting rule modeled by v.T h e yd i ® e ri n
the expectations about this coalition. The ¯rst index corresponds to the assumption that
S is formed by i and the players who precede her or him in an ordering chosen at random.
While ¯i(v) in coalition S is chosen at random among all coalitions to which i belongs.
Both indices are in fact the restriction to SGn of two well-known linear maps from Gn to
Rn, the Shapley value and the Banzhaf semivalue, that we will denote Shn and Bzn too.
3 LOTTERIES ON VOTING PROCEDURES
We are concerned with the problem of ranking decision-making procedures, taking power
pro¯les generated either by the Shapley-Shubik index or by the Banzhaf index as prim-
itives. Note that in both cases the number of possible power pro¯les, that is, the sets
Shn(SGn)a n dBzn(SGn), are ¯nite, as the number of simple superadditive n-person
games is. In order to introduce and formalize in a more tractable way any index of
inequality in this context, it is more convenient to extend the set of feasible pro¯les by
convexifying these ¯nite sets. That is, considering the convex hull of the set of the Shapley-
Shubik (resp., Banzhaf ) pro¯les of all n-person simple superadditive games as the set of
pro¯les to deal with. Let us denote this set Co(Shn(SGn)) (resp., Co(Bzn(SGn))).
This choice makes sense. The Shapley value, Shn, and the Banzhaf semivalue, Bzn,
both de¯ned on Gn, are linear maps. Therefore, Co(Shn(SGn)=Shn(Co(SGn)), where
the last set is formed by the Shapley values of the convex hull of the set of all n-person
simple superadditive games. Similarly, with the same notation, we have Co(Bzn(SGn)) =
Bzn(Co(SGn)). So, in both cases this convexi¯cation corresponds to enlarging the under-
lying set of games to Co(SGn), the set of all convex combinations of simple superadditive
games. Games in this set can be interpreted as -and identi¯ed with- lotteries on simple
superadditive games if the worth of a coalition in a lottery is de¯ned as the expected worth
7in the involved games, that is, its probability of being winning. Then, consistently, the
power pro¯le of a lottery on simple superadditive games, interpretable as an expected-
power pro¯le, is the value of the corresponding convex combination of games, given by
formulae (1) and (2) that, as commented above, make sense for any game in Gn and in
Co(SGn)i np a r t i c u l a r .
Moreover, an axiomatic characterization of both indices in Co(SGn) can be easily
achieved using some of the following assumptions concerning a map: © : Co(SGn) ! Rn;
v ! ©(v)=( © 1(v);:::;©n(v)). Some axioms that are common requirements both in SGn
and Gn also make sense in this domain. These are:
Anonymity (AN): For any permutation ¼ of N,a n da n yi 2 N,© i(¼v)=© ¼(i)(v);
where (¼v)(S): =v(¼(S)).
Null Player (NP): If v(S)=v(S nf ig) for all S; then ©i(v)=0 .
The anonymity axiom states that a player's measure of power does not depend on her or
his name. The null player axiom postulates that if a player's presence in any coalition
does not contribute to increase its probability of being winning, this player has no power.
The following two axioms, that distinguish the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf indices
in SGn, also make sense in this domain. They are:















(v(S) ¡ v(S nf ig)).
The constant total power axiom requires that all players' measures of power add up to 1
in any game. The Banzhaf total power axiom states that the players' measures of power
add up to the expected total number of swings divided by the number of coalitions to
which any player belongs.
In SGn these axioms together with Dubey's (1975) "transfer" axiom permit charac-
terizing both indices. In fact, the transfer axiom, devoid of any compelling interpretation,
plays in SGn t h er o l et h a tl i n e a r i t yp l a y si nGn. Moreover, the transfer axiom does not
make sense in Co(SGn), not even mathematically, for it is not closed with respect to the
operators "_"a n d" ^". The same can be said with respect to linearity. Instead, the
right assumption, both from the mathematical and the intuitive point of view, in our
intermediate domain is:
8Expected Power (EP): For all v;w 2 Co(SGn); and ¸ 2 [0;1]; ©(¸v +( 1¡ ¸)w)=
¸©(v)+( 1¡ ¸)©(w).
The meaning of this axiom is clear: it states that a player's measure of power in a lottery is
the expected power in the involved games. This assumption is especially natural if power,
as measured by both indices, is interpreted as an expectation. Then we can easily extend
Dubey and Shapley's (1979) characterization to Co(SGn):
Theorem 1 Let ©:Co(SGn) ! Rn; be an index of power.
1. The only © that satis¯es anonymity, null player, expected power and constant total
power is the Shapley value.
2. The only © that satis¯es anonymity, null player, expected power and Banzhaf total
power is the Banzhaf semivalue.
Proof: The proof is a simple adaptation in the set Co(SGn) of Dubey and Shapley's
characterization of the Shapley-Shubik index and of the Banzhaf index in SGn.
(i) The Shapley value obviously satis¯es all four axioms. With regard to uniqueness, ¯rst
note that EP on Co(SGn) implies Dubey and Shapley's transfer axiom on SGn.M o r e o v e r ,
NP, AN and CTP restricted to SGn yield Dubey and Shapley's other axioms. Therefore
the restriction of © to SGn is the Shapley value. Then, by EP, © and the Shapley value
must also coincide in all Co(SGn).
(ii) Similarly, the Banzhaf semivalue is the only value that satis¯es AN, NP, EP and BTP.
The di®erence between the Shapley value and the Banzhaf semivalue lies in one axiom:
the constant or the Banzhaf total power. The ¯rst axiom, usually referred to as "e±ciency"
in spite of the lack of meaning of this term in the context of value as a measure of power
(Laruelle and Valenciano, 1999), entails a constant addition of the players' power. While
for the Banzhaf semivalue, the (variable) addition of all players' power can be considered
as a measure of the expected ease of making a decision. Dubey and Shapley interpret
¹ ´(v) in the context of decision-making processes as "a kind of democratic participation
index, measuring the decision's rule sensitivity to the desires of the 'average voter' or to
the 'public will'." (Dubey and Shapley, (1979), p. 106). The same interpretation can be
given in the context of lotteries on voting rules in terms of expectations.
According to the above discussion, even if Co(SGn) is the common starting point,
we have two di®erent sets of power pro¯les to deal with depending on the index used to
generate them. If the Shapley index is used, this set is Co(Shn(SGn)), that is, the (n¡1)-
dimensional simplex whose extreme points are the vectors of the natural basis of Rn.W e
9will denote ¢n this simplex. If Banzhaf is the index being used, this set is Co(Bzn(SGn)),
a symmetric (i.e., closed under permutations of the players), compact and convex subset
of Rn
+.
4 INEQUALITY INDICES FOR SHAPLEY-SHUBIK POWER
PROFILES
If Shapley-Shubik is the index used to generate the power pro¯les, we have the following
framework for each number n of players:
Shn In
Co(SGn) ¡! ¢n ¡! R.
That is, an inequality index is a function that associates a number with each power pro¯le
in the (n¡1)-simplex ¢n that is used to rank power pro¯les according to the so assessed
degree of inequality. In fact, in this way we have a composite index In ± Shn that ranks
games in Co(SGn)a n di nSGn in particular.
As stated before, the choice of an inequality index In should be based on the properties
one desires the index to satisfy, and these properties must be consistent with the properties
of the power index being used, Shapley-Shubik in this case. As recalled in the previous
section, the Shapley-Shubik value is characterized as the unique power index in Co(SGn)
that satis¯es anonymity, null player, expected power and constant total power. Constant
total power is behind the choice of the domain for In,t h a ti s ,t h e( n ¡ 1)-simplex ¢n.
Consistent with the anonymity axiom of Shn, it is natural to require the following condition
that we will refer to as anonymity too:
Anonymity (AN): For all ' 2 ¢n; and any permutation ¼ of N: In('1;:::;'n)=
In('¼(1);:::;'¼(n)).
The meaning of this axiom, usual in other contexts, is obvious: the degree of inequality
in a power pro¯le does not depend on how are labelled its components.
Now we turn our attention to the expected power axiom characterizing Shn.I nf a c tt h i s
is equivalent to require the convex linearity of the power index, a weak form of linearity
restricted to convex combinations. If In satis¯ed convex linearity, this would compose
nicely with Shn's convex linearity, and would permit to interchange In and randomization.
But it is clear that asking for linearity unrestrictedly for an inequality index in ¢n would
not work. This condition together with anonymity would yield a constant index because
any point in the simplex ¢n is a convex combination of its extreme points. So, for any
10pro¯le ' 2 ¢n,w ew o u l dh a v e :In('1;::::;'n)='1In(1;0;::::;0) + ::: + 'nIn(0;:::;0;1) =
In(1;0;::::;0). In fact, this is the e®ect of requiring, together with anonymity, convex
linearity on pro¯les in which the players are di®erently ranked according to their power.
Convex linearity can only be required on "co-ranked" pro¯les, that is, pairs of pro¯les ',
'0 such that for all i;j 2 N; 'i <' j ) '0
i · '0
j. Moreover, taking into account the
interpretation of convex combinations as random mixtures, this requirement would mean
that lotteries on voting procedures, in which the players are equally ranked according to
their power, are ranked according to a von Neumann-Morgenstern preference ordering.
In other words, the inequality in a lottery on decision-making processes (with identically
ranked players) is the expected inequality of the involved decision-making processes. This
seems a very reasonable assumption in any context in which, as in this case, ordering
lotteries on a given ¯xed set of alternatives is the point at issue. So we propose the
following condition:
Expected Inequality on Co-ranked pro¯les (EIC): For all pair of co-ranked power
pro¯les ';'0 2 ¢n; and all ¸ 2 [0;1] : In(¸' +( 1¡ ¸)'0)=¸In(')+( 1¡ ¸)In('0):
Note that any index satisfying anonymity is fully determined by its restriction to any of
the n! sets of co-ranked vectors in ¢n. The following lemma shows that any of these sets
is an (n ¡ 1)-subsimplex of the simplex ¢n, and is the convex-hull of the Shapley-Shubik
power pro¯les of n unanimity games. Using ek to denote the vector where the k ¯rst
components are equal to 1=k and the others are null, we have:
Lemma 1 The set of all power pro¯les ('1;::::;'n) 2 ¢n such that '1 ¸ ::: ¸ 'n is an






Proof: It su±ces to check that ('1;::::;'n) can be uniquely written as a convex combina-
tion of e1, ...,ek,..., en to get the result.
Just permuting the components we get the extreme points of the other n!¡1 simplices
of co-ranked pro¯les. In fact, they form a simplicial partition of ¢n. This means that any
power pro¯le in ¢n can be uniquely expressed as a convex combination of the Shapley-
Shubik power pro¯les of n unanimity games co-ranked with it. In sum, any index satisfying
expected inequality on co-ranked pro¯les would rank co-ranked power pro¯les according
to a preference ordering satisfying von Neumann-Morgenstern assumptions, and would
be fully determined by the values of the index for these 2n ¡ 1 pro¯les. If the index also
11satis¯es anonymity then it would be fully determined by In(e1),...., In(ek);:::, In(en). More
precisely, we have the following result:
Theorem 2 An index In :¢ n ! R, satis¯es anonymity and expected inequality on co-





kIn(ek) ¡ (k ¡ 1)In(ek¡1)
´
^ 'k, (3)
where ^ ' =(^ '1;::::; ^ 'n) denotes the vector that results by re-ordering ''s components de-
creasingly, and In(e0) is set up equal to 0.
Proof: First it is easy to check that the index given by (3) satis¯es AN and EIC. Now let
In be an index satisfying these axioms. By AN, In(')=In(^ ') . B yL e m m a1a n dE I C ,
we obtain:
In(^ '1;::::; ^ 'n)=In
Ã n X
k=1










kIn(ek) ¡ (k ¡ 1)In(ek¡1)
´
^ 'k.
So, these two conditions, anonymity and expected inequality on co-ranked pro¯les,
restrict drastically the class of indices. In fact, this is Einy and Peleg's ¯rst family of
indices (Theorem 3.1). More precisely, comparing (3) and formula (3.4) in Einy and Peleg
(1991), it easily follows the following
Corollary 1 An ordering on Co(SGn) is the restriction to this domain of an ordering on
Gn that satis¯es the assumptions in Theorem 3.1 of Einy and Peleg (1991) if and only if
it is representable by a composite index In±Shn where In satis¯es anonymity and expected
inequality on co-ranked pro¯les.
This family of orderings/indices on Co(SGn) can be characterized also directly adapt-
ing Einy and Peleg's axioms to our domain. This can be done by means of some plausible
adaptations (for instance, using convex combinations instead of additions of games, and
taking into account that the only inessential games in our domain are the convex combina-
tions of dictatorships). But the result, though mathematically correct, is not completely
satisfactory. As we discuss with more detail in the concluding remarks, the natural adap-
tation of some of their axioms lacks intuitive appeal in the context of voting procedures.
12Observe also that formula (3) is more expressive than formula (3.4) of Einy and Peleg
(1991), for it gives a precise meaning to the coe±cients about which Einy and Peleg's
formula says nothing. In particular it permits at least a plausible further narrowing of
the family, as we presently show. As we have mentioned in the introduction, the original
motivation of our work was to assess inequality in the distribution of power in real world
collective decision-making situations. This requires an index, not just a family of them.
So, accepting anonymity and expected inequality on co-ranked pro¯les, a further narrow-
ing of the resulting class of indices is still to be done. In order to single out an index,
a c c o r d i n gt of o r m u l a( 3 ) ,ac h o i c ef o rt h ev a l u e so fIn(ek)( k =1 ;:::;n) is necessary (and
su±cient).
Some reasonable constraints on this choice can easily be made. The comparison of the
degree of inequality in pro¯les in which the power is equally shared by a group of players
is obvious: the bigger the number of null players the bigger the degree of inequality. For
each nonempty S µ N,l e teS denote the pro¯le whose S-components are 1
s and the rest










A further natural condition is to require some relative-to-size sensitivity to the addition

















for all i 2 N n S, j 2 N n T: The ¯rst condition is a form of monotonicity,w h i l et h e
second is a form of convexity. B o t hr e s t r i c tt h er a n g eo fc h o i c eo fIn(ek); and therefore
the coe±cients in formula (3). In fact, adding these conditions entail, respectively, the
positivity and the nondecreasing order of the coe±cients in (3), exactly the two further
conditions Einy and Peleg (Theorems 3.4 and 3.6) get for their coe±cients by adding their
"monotonicity" and "equality mindedness" requirements (see also Weymark (1981) and
Yaari (1988)). But none of this assumptions is strong enough to single out an index. The
same can be said about other assumptions common in the literature of inequality, as for
instance the "progressive transfer".
Thus, in this point any step beyond is arguable, though necessary to specify an index.
Our choice here is the simplest one compatible with the above conditions: we just require
that these di®erences are constant and positive. As we will show it yields a tractable
index. We have then the following condition:
Constant Sensitivity to Null Players (CSNP): There exists a constant Kn > 0









13It seems clear that the power pro¯le in which the power is shared equally among all
players corresponds to the minimum of inequality. On pure normalizing grounds we can
assign to this power pro¯le a zero index of inequality. That is:





It can be shown that these axioms are not independent. Anonymity is implied by two
of the other axioms as the following lemma shows:
Lemma 2 If an index In :¢ n ! R satis¯es expected inequality on co-ranked pro¯les and
constant sensitivity to null players, then it satis¯es anonymity.
Proof: Let In be an index satisfying EIC and CSNP. Let s<n . Applying (n ¡ s)t i m e s





















: Now let ' 2 ¢n.B yL e m m a1 ,' can be
u n i q u e l yw r i t t e na sac o n v e xc o m b i n a t i o no ft h ee x t r e m ep o i n t so fa n( n ¡ 1)- simplex of
p o w e rp r o ¯ l e sc o - r a n k e dw i t hi t . I ft h e s ee x t r e m ep o i n t sa r eeS1;e S2 :::; eSn; where the
cardinality of Sk is k,w eh a v e :' =
n P
k=1
¸keSk (for some ¸k ¸ 0 such that
n P
k=1
¸k =1 ) .
Then by EIC: In(')=
n P
k=1
¸kIn(eSk). But then In(')=In(¼') for any permutation ¼ of
N,f o re a c hIn(eSk) only depends on k.
The remaining three axioms uniquely characterize (up to a constant) an inequality
index as follows:
Theorem 3 There is a unique (up to a positive proportionality constant Kn)i n e q u a l i t y
index In :¢ n ! R, satisfying expected inequality on co-ranked pro¯les, constant sensitivity




(n ¡ 2k +1 )^ 'k. (4)
Proof: First, it is easy to check that the index given by (4) satis¯es these axioms. Now let
In b ea ni n d e xs a t i s f y i n gt h e m .B yL e m m a2 ,i ts a t i s ¯ e sA Nt o o .T h u s ,b yT h e o r e m2 ,








, constant for any pair
i;S such that i= 2 S µ N by CSNP, and using ZN, it follows easily that In(ek)=( n¡k)Kn.
Then, substituting in (3), it yields (4).
In the preceding discussion the number of players has been considered ¯xed. But in
certain cases one can be interested in comparing power pro¯les involving di®erent number
14of players. For instance, in the case mentioned in the introduction -the evolution of the
distribution of power in the European Union along the years- the number of countries and
the number of citizens are not constant. Then an inequality index should be de¯ned as
af u n c t i o nI :
S
n ¢n ! R, while the above three axioms would only characterize up to a
family of constants (Kn)n2N, a family of indices I = fIn :¢ n ! R j n =2 ;3;:::g,o n ef o r
each number of players.
In fact, the domain of each function in this family is di®erent, and only zero nor-
malization connects the value of the index for di®erent number of players establishing a
"common zero" for °at pro¯les. So, even if the above axioms are accepted for any number
of players n, there is still a constant Kn undetermined for each number of players. The
choice of this constant is immaterial for a ¯xed number of players. But this choice matters
if power pro¯les with di®erent number of players are to be compared by means of the cor-
responding In. In this case the above family of functions can be used to de¯ne a function
I :
S
n ¢n ! R. Assuming the three axioms for any number of players, an index I would
be completely speci¯ed if we postulate some equivalence principle relating the inequality
index of pro¯les with di®erent number of players. A weak reasonable principle would be
requiring I(1;0n¡1) · I(1;0n), where (1;0n)=( 1 ;0;:::;0) 2 Rn+1,t h a ti s ,t h ed e g r e eo f
inequality cannot increase if we reduce the number of 0-players in a dictatorship. Using
formula (4), we have I(1;0n¡1)=( n ¡ 1)Kn, thus this would entail for the constants the
condition (n¡1)Kn · nKn+1,f o rn =2 ;::: Within this range of choices we underline two
t h a tc a nb ed e f e n d e do nt h e i ro w ng r o u n d s . Am o s ts i m p l ec h o i c ei st h a to fac o m m o n
degree of inequality for any dictatorship, whatever the number of players. That is:
Dictator Player Equivalence Principle (DPEP): For all n =2 ;3;:::,
I(1;0n¡1)=I(1;0n):
Note that for a given number of players, the dictatorship is the situation in which the
degree of inequality is maximal. Therefore the above mentioned principle establishes a
"common maximum" of inequality for any number of players, which is reached when there
is a dictator. This entails for the constants the relation Kn =( 1
n¡1)K,w h e r eK is an
arbitrary positive constant.
This principle can be criticized on the basis that, from the inequality point of view,
it can be argued that the bigger the number of players in a dictatorship the worse. A
di®erent equivalence principle that is sensitive to this idea is the following:




15That is, the index of the pro¯le associated with a dictatorship is the same as that of a
pro¯le in which the power of the dictator is equally split into that of two members, without
changing the number of null players. This implies a simple relation between the constants:
all of them are equal, that is, Kn = K,w h e r eK is an arbitrary positive constant. Note
that this axiom is a weaker form of a general and clear principle that is satis¯ed by the
index so characterized below, as it can be easily checked. The general principle considers
as equivalent from the inequality point of view pro¯les with di®erent number of players in
which the power is equally shared by a group of them, as far as the number of null players
is the same in both.
So, two indices (depending on which equivalence principle is assumed) are characterized
up to a positive constant:
Theorem 4 There is a unique (up to a positive proportionality constant K)i n e q u a l i t y
index:
S
n ¢n ! R satisfying expected inequality on co-ranked pro¯les, constant sensitivity
to null players and zero normalization for any n, and satisfying the dictator player equiv-










(n ¡ 2k +1 )^ 'k: (6)
Reconsidering the constant sensitivity to null players, another characterization of INP
can be given. Let us examine the e®ect of adding a null player to a decision-making
process. It is easy to check that the following equation is satis¯ed:
INP('1;::::;'n;0) = INP('1;::::;'n)+K: (7)
This property could be properly called "constant sensitivity to null players" in a stronger
a n dm o r eg e n e r a ls e n s et h a nt h em e a n i n gw eh a v eg i v e nt ot h e s ew o r d si no u ra x i o m .M o r e -
over, assuming INP(1) = 0; this property together with zero normalization implies both
the constant sensitivity to null players axiom and the null players equivalence principle.
Thus this property can replace both axioms in the characterization of INP.
It is worth noting that if we choose instead, for each n, Kn = 1
n as the value of the
constants, we obtain the usual, in other contexts, Gini index. It does not, however, obey
any clear equivalence principle. We get in this case:
I(1;0n)=( n2
n2¡1) I(1;0n¡1):
Note also that when the number of players is large, the Gini index is very close to IDP.
165 INEQUALITY INDICES FOR BANZHAF POWER PRO-
FILES
Let us consider now the case of power pro¯les generated by the Banzhaf semivalue. In
this case the framework for each number n of players is:
Bzn Jn
Co(SGn) ¡! Co(Bzn(SGn)) ¡! R:
So, now the generated set of pro¯les is Co(Bzn(SGn)), as mentioned before, a symmetric,
compact and convex subset of Rn
+ that strictly contains the (n¡1)-simplex ¢n.T h u s ,n o w
the set of feasible pro¯les is not a simplex, nor (n ¡ 1)-dimensional either. For instance,
even in the case of only three players, there are Banzhaf pro¯les whose components add
up to more than one, and less in other cases. So, an inequality index in this context is a
function that associates a number with each power pro¯le in this set. Again for any such
an index Jn we have a composite index Jn ± Bzn that ranks games in Co(SGn).
In principle similar arguments to those used in Section 3 would motivate the assump-
tions of anonymity, constant sensitivity to null players and zero normalization for an
inequality index Jn, now applied to pro¯les in the new domain Co(Bzn(SGn)). But now
the domain is wider, and the wider the domain the stronger any requirement on the objects
of the domain. This is specially so in the case of expected inequality on co-ranked pro¯les.
As we will see later on, this assumption in this domain, though meaningful, restricts too
much the set of indices. So, instead, we will require only a restricted form of this condition.
Recall the sum of the components of a Banzhaf pro¯le can be interpreted as a democratic
participation index of the decision-making process. We require convex linearity only on
pairs of co-ranked power pro¯les with identical democratic participation index. We have
thus the following axiom:
Restricted Expected Inequality on Co-ranked pro¯les (RCLC): For any pair of








¸ 2 [0;1] : Jn(¸¯ +( 1¡ ¸)¯0)=¸Jn(¯)+( 1¡ ¸)Jn(¯0):
Now we need some axiom relating the inequality index of power pro¯les with di®erent
"democracy indices", for none of the former axioms does. In the literature on inequality,
a distinction is often made between relative and absolute indices, depending on which is
considered relevant, the ratios or the di®erences between the components of any pro¯le.
Note that this distinction was meaningless for the Shapley-Shubik power pro¯les whose
components always add up to 1. These two principles can be expressed as follows:
17Relative Index (RI): For all pairs of power pro¯les ¯;¸¯ 2 Co(Bzn(SGn)); (¸ 2 R):
Jn(¸¯)=Jn(¯):
Absolute Index (AI): For all pairs of power pro¯les ¯;¯+¸eN 2 Co(Bzn(SGn)); (¸ 2
R): Jn(¯ + ¸eN)=Jn(¯):
Each of these principles, together with the former axioms, will allow us to characterize
two inequality indices.
Theorem 5 There is a unique (up to a positive proportionality constant Kn)a b s o l u t e( r e -
spectively, relative) inequality index Jn : Co(Bzn(SGn)) ! R satisfying restricted expected
inequality on co-ranked pro¯les, constant sensitivity to null players and zero normalization.













Proof: First, it is straightforward to check that Jan is an absolute index (AI) and Jrn a
relative index (RI). It is also immediate to check that both satisfy REIC, CSNP and ZN.
Now, let Jn be an absolute index satisfying the other three conditions in Co(Bzn(SGn)).
Note that ¢n is contained in Co(Bzn(SGn)), and REIC implies EIC on ¢n. Then, by
Theorem 3, such an index, satisfying EIC, CSNP and ZN in ¢n,m u s tb eg i v e nb y( 8 )o n
¢n. It is only left to be shown that this formula is valid for any pro¯le in the domain. So,
let ¯ be a pro¯le in Co(Bzn(SGn)) such that do not exist ¯0 2 ¢n and ¸ 2 R such that
¯ = ¯0 + ¸eN (otherwise, by AI, it is immediate). Then, denoting ´(¯): =
n P
k=1
¯k,i tm u s t
be ´(¯) > 1. As Co(Bzn(SGn)) is symmetric and convex, it contains ´(¯)eN. Then, for
¹ 2 (0;1) su±ciently close to 0, it will be ¹¯ +(1¡¹)´(¯)eN +(1¡´(¯))eN 2 ¢n. Then,
applying ¯rst ZN and AI, then REIC, and again AI, we have:
¹Jn(¯)= ¹Jn(¯)+( 1¡ ¹)Jn(´(¯)eN)=Jn(¹¯ +( 1¡ ¹)´(¯)eN)
= Jn(¹¯ +( 1¡ ¹)´(¯)1N +( 1¡ ´(¯))eN +( ´(¯) ¡ 1)eN)
= Jn(¹¯ +( 1¡ ¹)´(¯)eN +( 1¡ ´(¯))eN)
= Jn(¹¯ +( 1¡ ¹´(¯))eN).




(n ¡ 2k +1 )^ ¯k,t h a ti s ,Jn(¯)=Jan(¯). Finally, let Jn be a relative index
satisfying the other three conditions in Co(Bzn(SGn)). Now the proof is immediate: as
before, by Theorem 2, the index must be given by (8) on ¢n (note in ¢n (8) and (9)
18coincide). For any pro¯le ¯ in Co(Bzn(SGn)), it is ¯=´(¯) 2 ¢n.T h e n ,b yR I ,w eh a v e
Jn(¯)=Jn(´(¯)(¯=´(¯))) = Jn(¯=´(¯)) = Jrn(¯).
It can be shown that (unrestricted) expected inequality on co-ranked pro¯les, constant
sensitivity to null players and zero normalization (extended to all °at pro¯les) characterize
Jan on Co(Bzn(SGn)). Therefore, requiring expected inequality on co-ranked pro¯les on
Co(Bzn(SGn)) implicitly implies the choice of an absolute index. It is in this sense that
we have said that expected inequality on co-ranked pro¯les is too strong an assumption
in this wider domain.
Now we turn our attention to a general index J :
S
n Co(Bzn(SGn)) ! R to deal with
di®erent numbers of players. The situation is similar to that in the previous section: only
the zero normalization connects the value of the index for di®erent number of players,
establishing, together with the relative (resp., absolute) index axiom, a "common zero"
for all °at pro¯les. So, assuming either a relative index or an absolute index and the
other three axioms, there is still a constant Kn undetermined for each number of players.
Again, we can use any of the two equivalence principles used with the same purpose in
the previous section. Thus, depending on the relative or absolute character of the index
and the equivalence principle used, four di®erent indices arise.
Theorem 6 There is a unique (up to a positive proportionality constant K)a b s o l u t e
inequality index:
S
n Co(Bzn(SGn)) ! R satisfying restricted expected inequality on co-
ranked pro¯les, constant sensitivity to null players, and zero normalization for any n,a n d
satisfying the dictator player equivalence principle (respectively the null players equivalence









(n ¡ 2k +1 )^ ¯k: (11)
Theorem 7 There is a unique (up to a positive proportionality constant K)r e l a t i v ei n -
equality index:
S
n Co(Bzn(SGn)) ! R satisfying restricted expected inequality on co-
ranked pro¯les, constant sensitivity to null players, and zero normalization for any n,a n d
satisfying the dictator player equivalence principle (respectively the null players equivalence


















It is worth remarking that despite the apparent perfect symmetry between the char-
acterizations of both pairs of absolute and relative indices, there are some important
di®erences concerning the meaning of the equivalence principles, or more precisely, their
consequences, in the presence of the remaining assumptions.
Let us ¯rst consider the dictator player equivalence principle, which states that the
degree of inequality is identical in all dictatorships, whatever the number of players. As
noted in the previous section, in the case of Shapley-Shubik power pro¯les, this princi-
ple entails a "common maximum" degree of inequality, that is reached when there is a
dictator, whatever the number of players. Similarly, in the case of Banzhaf power pro¯les
the relative inequality index is maximal when there is a dictator. Therefore, the dicta-
tor player equivalence principle also entails a "common maximum" of inequality for any
number of players in the case of the relative index. But this is not true for the absolute
inequality index: there exist simple superadditive games2 whose Banzhaf pro¯les lead to a
larger absolute index of inequality than the index of a dictatorship with the same number
of players. This fact, intimately related to the absolute character of the index, makes the
interpretation of this equivalence principle less intuitive.
Now, let us turn our attention to the null player equivalence principle. As noted in
the previous section, in the context of Shapley-Shubik pro¯les, this is a particular case of
a more general principle stating that pro¯les with di®erent number of players in which
t h ep o w e ri se q u a l l ys h a r e db yag r o u po ft h e m ,a r ec o n s i d e r e da se q u i v a l e n tf r o mt h e
inequality point of view if the number of null players is the same. It can be seen that this
general principle continues to be valid for the relative index, but no more for the absolute
index. This general principle does not even hold any more for a ¯xed number of players,


























Finally, let us consider the constant sensitivity to null players. It is easy to check that
2For instance, let u be the compound game (see Owen (1982) for a de¯nition) in which the ¯rst stage
games are the simple majority games with 7;3;5a n dm4 players, respectively, and the second stage game
is the 4-person simple game in which the only minimal coalitions are f1;2g and f1;3g.I tc a nb ec h e c k e d
that Ja(Bz(u)) >Ja (1;014+m4) whenever m4 > 5.
3The ¯rst Banzhaf pro¯le corresponds to a game where any coalition containing the ¯rst three players
is winning, while the second corresponds to a game where any coalition containing at least two of the ¯rst
three players is winning.





JrNP(¯1;::::;¯n;0) = JrNP(¯1;::::;¯n)+K; (15)
where K is the constant that appears in (11) or (13). Again, in the case of the relative
index, this property could be properly called "constant sensitivity to null players" in the
stronger and more general sense given in the previous section. This property can also
replace the constant sensitivity to null players axiom and the null players equivalence
principle in the characterization of JrNP. But let us examine the situation underlying
formulae (7), (14) and (15). In fact, this corresponds to the addition of a null player to
a game. Indeed, if we consider two games (N;v)a n d( N0;v0), with N0 = N [f n +1 g
and v0(S)=v(S \ N) for any coalition S µ N0, it follows from formulae (1) and (2) that
Shn+1(v0)=( Shn(v);0) and Bzn+1(v0)=( Bzn(v);0): That is, the e®ect in the power
pro¯le is just adding one zero for the new component, the rest continuing to be the same.
Thus these formulae yield:
INP(Shn+1(v0)) = INP(Shn(v)) + K ,
JaNP(Bzn+1(v0)) = JaNP(Bzn(v)) + K
¹ ´(v)
2n¡1;
JrNP(Bzn+1(v0)) = JrNP(Bzn(v)) + K:
These equations re°ect through our inequality indices some di®erences between the Shap-
ley value and the Banzhaf semivalue used as power indices and between the absolute and
the relative inequality indices. In fact, the impact of adding a null player on JaNP is
not constant, as it is on INP or JrNP. It depends on the game the null player joins. To
illustrate it, let us consider two symmetric decision-making processes: a unanimity rule
and a simple majority rule. Each player's Shapley value is identical in both games (by the
constant total power axiom), while each player's Banzhaf semivalue is larger in the simple
majority game than in the unanimity game. The inequality indices are, however, identical
in all cases and equal to zero. The introduction of a null player in both games changes
in both cases the inequality index from zero to K if the Shapley pro¯les are considered.
The result is the same for the relative inequality index with the Banzhaf pro¯les while
the absolute inequality index varies from zero to K
¹ ´(v)
2n¡1. Therefore the impact of adding
a null player is bigger with regard to the absolute inequality in the simple majority rule
than in the unanimity rule. This re°ects that the di®erence in terms of power between the
null player and the others is larger in the simple majority rule than in the unanimity rule.
This seems consistent with Dubey and Shapley's interpretation of ¹ ´(v) as a "democratic
participation index".
21Finally, observe that, if for any Banzhaf pro¯le ¯, ¯a and ¯r denote, respectively, the
additive and the multiplicative normalization of ¯; then Ja(¯)=I(¯a)a n dJr(¯)=I(¯r),
if I is de¯ned by formula (4) on the hyperplane
P
i2N
¯i =1( a n dt h i sf o re a c ho ft h ev a r i a n t s
of these indices).
6 ILLUSTRATION: THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
As an illustration of the computation and working of the inequality indices introduced in
Sections 4 and 5, we apply them to compare the two di®erent decision processes, before
and after 1965, of the UN Security Council.
Since the creation of the Security Council, in 1945, up to 1965, decisions on issues
of substance required the approval of its 5 permanent members and at least 2 of its 6
non-permanent members. This procedure was often criticized because of the excessive
power given to the ¯ve permanent members. In 1965, in order to reduce the power of
the permanent members, the number of non-permanent members was augmented to 10,
and decisions required, in addition to that of the 5 permanent members, the positive
vote of 4 of the 10 non-permanent members. The e®ectiveness of this reform has been
critically analyzed with di®erent approaches (see, e.g., Riker and Ordeshook (1973) and
Winter (1996)). We just apply our inequality indices to both Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf
power pro¯les of the following 11 and 15-person games that formally describe both decision
processes.
Before 1965: let N = P [T be the set of players, where P denotes the permanent members





1i f P ½ S and s ¸ 7,
0o t h e r w i s e .
After 1965: let N0 = P [T0 be the set of players, where P denotes the permanent members





1i f P ½ S and s ¸ 9,
0o t h e r w i s e .
The power pro¯les are respectively given by





22Applying formulae (5, 6, 10, 11, 12, and 13), we respectively get:
Before 1965 (N,v) After 1965 (N0;v0)
IDP(Sh) K 0:5857 K 0:6943
INP(Sh) K 5:8571 K 9:7203
JaDP(Bz) K 0:1523 K 0:1665
JaNP(Bz) K 1:5234 K 2:3315
JrDP(Bz) K 0:4952 K 0:5371
JrNP(Bz) K 4:9524 K 7:5197
It is remarkable the coincidence in the assessment of the comparative degree of in-
equality: all inequality indices, either based on the dictator player equivalence principle
or based on the null players equivalence principle, either applied to Shapley-Shubik or to
Banzhaf pro¯les, either absolute or relative in this case, rank both decision-making pro-
cesses in the same way: after 1965 the inequality has increased. This seems contradictory
w i t ht h es u p p o s e da i mo ft h er e f o r m . B u ta sw eh a v em e n t i o n e db e f o r e ,d o u b t sa b o u t
its e®ectiveness have been already raised. Winter (1996) points out two opposite e®ects
of the reform: "On the one hand, it becomes harder for veto players to form a winning
coalition because that requires the supporting votes of more non veto members. On the
other hand, the power of non veto members may be reduced since each such member now
has more substitutes than before." So, the permanent members' power decreases, but in
the whole our indices evaluate that from the inequality point of view the situation has
been worse since 1965.
7C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S
As we say in the introduction, this paper is meant as a ¯rst step to provide an axiomatic
support to some inequality indices to deal with comparisons of voting procedures according
to the degree of inequality in the distribution of power. To do so we have tried to put
forward conditions that make sense in terms of the involved concept of power in voting
systems. We want to stress some positive points and some di±culties, as well as pointing
out some lines of further research along the two approaches discussed in the introduction.
We want to emphasize the meaningfulness of the underlying domain of games that we
propose, that is, the convex hull of simple superadditive games. This domain, interpreted
as the set of probabilistic mixtures of simple superadditive games is a natural extension
of the usual domain of simple superadditive games as formal descriptions of voting pro-
cedures. In connection with our endeavor, it is worth stressing two points. First, this
underlying choice gives a clear support in this context to our assumption of (restricted
23or not) "expected inequality on co-ranked pro¯les". Second, signi¯cantly, this one seems
to be the only domain where Einy and Peleg's work could be meaningfully restated in
the context of distribution of power. Indeed, on the one hand, the class of TU-games
that they consider goes too far beyond the models of voting rules. On the other hand, in
the domain of simple superadditive games that is usually used to model voting rules, the
axioms that they propose do not make sense (because the addition of two simple games
is not a simple game). In the domain that we propose the worth of a coalition can be
interpreted as the probability of being winning, and the axioms they propose make sense
if convex combination of games is taken instead of addition of games.
We have extended Dubey and Shapley's axiomatizations of the two best-known power
indices to this domain. Then, taking the corresponding power pro¯les as primitives, we
have axiomatized some measures of inequality in the distribution of power. Consequently,
the choice of one of our inequality indices requires the previous choice of a power index.
This choice may depend on the context (Laruelle, 1999), but to evaluate the ap r i o r i
capacity to in°uence the outcome of a vote in a given voting rule, the Banzhaf semivalue
seems more suitable than the Shapley-Shubik index (and any other existing power indices).
However, the results concerning the Shapley-Shubik pro¯les seem more solid because the
absence of the absolute/relative dichotomy raises no doubts. Instead, when dealing with
Banzhaf pro¯les this issue may raise some doubts. Indeed, as discussed in the last few
paragraphs of Section 5, both "equivalence principles", as well as the "constant sensitivity
to null players" have a more clear meaning for a relative inequality index than for an
absolute one. In this sense, the indices I and Jr seem to be better founded. Concerning the
practical applications of these tools, in the example considered in Section 6 the message
transmitted by all indices go in the same direction. However it remains to be checked
whether this is often the case or not.
With respect to the second approach, using the simple games (or lotteries over them)
as primitives, we claim that the mechanical application of Einy and Peleg's results do
not make sense. This approach, maybe more ambitious, is still an interesting line for
further research to be carried out in this speci¯c context. Here we would like to stress
again the speci¯city of simple superadditive games when they are used to model decision-
making procedures. Indeed, if simple superadditive games are a subdomain of TU-games,
compelling intuitions for TU-games do not necessarily remain intuitive when they are
interpreted as decision-making processes. For instance, if Einy and Peleg's work appears
well-founded for the general class of TU-games, they implicitly take for granted e±ciency,
which seems indeed quite natural in many contexts. But in the context of decision-
making processes, the e±ciency implicit in their independence axiom may lead to some
24counterintuitive results. Restated in our domain, this axiom would say that for any games
u;v;w 2 Co(SGn) such that u and v are T-symmetric4 for some coalition T,a n da n y¸
(0 · ¸ · 1), it must be: ¸u +( 1¡ ¸)w » ¸v +( 1¡ ¸)w. But the following example
shows how counterintuitive some of the consequences of this axiom can be in the context
of decision making processes. Let N = f1;2;::;6g;T= f1;2;3g, u and w the unanimity
games u = uT, w = uNnT and v the simple superadditive game whose winning coalitions
are those containing at least two players of coalition T.A s u and v are T-symmetric
games, any binary relation on Co(SGn) satisfying the adapted IND must yield: 1=2uT +
1=2uNnT » 1=2v+1=2uNnT. And while intuition (as just anonymity) compellingly suggests
t h a ti nt h el e f th a n ds i d el o t t e r ye q u a l i t yi sp e r f e c t ,t h i si sn o tt h ec a s ei nt h er i g h th a n d
side lottery, where the power of any player in T seems prima facie di®erent from that
of any player in NnT. In fact, this example yields some interesting conclusions. First,
it shows that the validity of the above sketched translation of Einy and Peleg's results
to our domain is quite questionable. Therefore, their program, according to which the
axiomatic foundation of inequality should take as primitives the games instead of the
pro¯les associated to them by any particular solution, is still to be re-thought from the
beginning in the context of collective decision processes. Second, the direct intuition
provided by this example can be held critically against the suitability of the Shapley value
as a measure of power in collective decision processes: this measure associates identical
power pro¯les with both lotteries, and, a fortiori, any inequality measure that explicitly
or implicitly embodies this index would identify them from the point of view of inequality,
against the direct assessment provided by intuition. It is remarkable how in this example
both concepts, power and inequality, or, better, the clear and direct intuition of them at
a pre-formal level, con°icts with the use of the Shapley value as a measure of power.
4A T-symmetric game is a game in which all players outside coalition T are null players, while all
players inside T are substitutes.
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